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5 October 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EDT 4 Oct)

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1

Moscow continued its relatively moderate treatment of the German problem during the past week. Authoritative Communist bloc media asserted the USSR's desire to settle the problem through negotiations with the Allied powers. Soviet propaganda also reflected Moscow's sensitivity to possible West German acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. On 1 October Khrushchev reiterated the USSR's willingness to accept the neutralist memorandum as the basis for a solution of the nuclear test-ban issue.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN SITUATION Page 3

The number of identified Cuban surface-to-air and coastal defense missile sites built by Soviet personnel is increasing.

Soviet propaganda has centered on alleged US efforts to "pressure" Latin American states into taking joint action against the Castro regime.

COMMUNIST CHINA CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY Page 5

Peiping introduced a note of restrained optimism at its 13th anniversary celebrations on 1 October by implying that the economic decline of the past three years had reached bottom. The lack of supporting evidence in the form of recent output figures or future targets, however, suggests that the regime is still extremely cautious over its economic prospects. Commentary surrounding National Day ceremonies reflected continuing concern over problems of party discipline and mass support. Peiping also used the occasion to affirm its opposition to Soviet policies.

NATIONALISM IN THE MONGOLIAN PARTY Page 7

The recent purge of D. Tomor-Ochir, top-level member of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, reflects the regime's continuing efforts to suppress Mongol nationalism. Tomor-Ochir was charged with striving to revise party decisions denouncing nationalism and with attempting to arouse "national passions." Premier Tsedenbal's complete subservience to the Soviet Union has long irritated many Mongolians who want a more independent national identity within the Communist bloc.

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WANING EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY Page 8

In contrast to the success of the Common Market, the Coal-Steel Community (CSC)--the first of the three bodies set up by the Common Market countries in their move toward economic integration--has become increasingly ineffective. The most recent symptom of the malaise affecting the CSC was the resignation on 25 September of Dirk Spierenburg, vice president and most energetic and capable member of the CSC's nine-man executive, the High Authority. The High Authority's difficulties derive from the wavering support of supranationalism by the member countries as well as the uncertainty over the future of the CSC as a separate organization.

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BONN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM Page 9

A special "stabilization program" to halt growing inflationary trends is to be presented to the Bundestag when it reconvenes on 9 October. The program, which is also designed to strengthen Economics Minister Erhard's claim to succeed Adenauer, has as its major feature an "absolute" ceiling on the 1963 budget. The new budget calls for a reduction in some fields such as housing and indicates a slowdown in the defense buildup. Pressures to exceed the limitations in some categories may prove too strong and force the government to make cuts in foreign aid.

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FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN Page 11

The 1962 French UN delegation can be expected to display greater tactical flexibility than its recent predecessors, but it will still be circumscribed by De Gaulle's basic view that the United Nations should be no more than an international debating society. France probably will not comply with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding extraordinary UN expenses, nor will Paris press its influence with the French-speaking African countries on issues where French interests are not clearly at stake.

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THE REVOLT IN YEMEN Page 12

Major hostilities between the revolutionary regime's forces and tribal elements loyal to the monarchy are increasingly likely. The regime is encountering resistance in the northern province and in the area of the Aden border. The claimant to the Imamate, Prince Hasan, now is on the Saudi-Yemeni border attempting to rally his Yemeni tribal supporters for a counterrevolt. He has the backing of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The regime's leaders, many of whom have long been associated with the Egyptian-backed Free Yemeni Movement, are looking to Cairo for support and guidance.

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THE SITUATION IN LAOS Page 15

[redacted]

[redacted] there are continuing indications that the North Vietnamese intend to leave at least some elements in Laos to bolster the Pathet Lao forces after the 7 October deadline for withdrawal. The Pathet Lao, in an effort to force the disbandment of Meo guerrilla forces in northern and central Laos, are pressing for the cessation of US-chartered air resupply flights. Souvanna has persuaded North Vietnam briefly to delay sending its ambassador to Vientiane. Meanwhile Laos apparently is preparing to exchange representatives with East Germany. [redacted]

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THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO Page 16

Virtually no progress has been made on implementation of the UN reconciliation plan. The joint commission discussions in Elisabethville have succeeded only in pointing up wide divergencies between the two sides, and Adoula has categorically rejected Tshombé's request to discuss the constitution UN experts have drafted. Meanwhile, Adoula appears to have successfully carried off his moves to reassert Leopoldville's control over South Kasai and secessionist leader Albert Kalonji. [redacted]

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NEW ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT Page 17

A substantial opposition to Ben Bella is developing within the Algerian Constituent Assembly. This group, led by Hussein Ait Ahmed, comprises various tribal elements. It may cause increasing trouble when the government's legislative program is presented for approval and the constitution drafted. [redacted]

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SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS WORSEN Page 18

The tempo of charges and countercharges between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia has increased. The Somali Government is attempting to divert popular attention from internal problems by accusing Ethiopia of plots against the country. [redacted]

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LEGALIST FACTION ASSERTS CONTROL IN ARGENTINA Page 19

The establishment of firm control over the government by the Legalist military faction has lessened the possibility of an early renewal of the recent military power struggle. The Legalists, however, are not themselves agreed on policies to meet the country's problems. An early challenge to their unity will arise in connection with the issue of Peronist participation in forthcoming elections.

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THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS Page 20

At stake in the national elections on 7 October are 11 governorships, two thirds of the Senate seats, and all 409 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as a considerable number of lesser state offices. The gubernatorial contests are probably the most important. Governors in Brazil have much independent authority, including that of negotiating with bloc governments for economic aid. Preliminary indications are that as many as seven governorships could be won by anti-US candidates.

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TRENDS IN TRINIDAD AND JAMAICA Page 22

Political ferment has increased in both Jamaica and Trinidad since they became independent of Britain in August. Trinidad is renewing its long-standing controversies with the US over the Chaguaramas base and economic aid. The Jamaican Government--although strongly anti-Communist--is cautious in its relations with Cuba because of the large Jamaican community resident there, and because it fears Cuban subversive activities.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

NORTH KOREAN FACTIONALISM AND THE RISE OF KIM IL-SUNG . . Page 1

Kim Il-sung, an obscure officer of the Sovier Army in 1945, today holds a position of absolute power as chief of state and party in North Korea. His rise is due mainly to his ruthless determination and an uncanny instinct for political intrigue which served him well in one of the world's most faction-ridden Communist movements. Although victory over factionalism was officially proclaimed at the fourth congress of the Korean Workers Party in September 1961, the history of the party suggests that Kim cannot afford to relax his vigilance.

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SOVIET ANTARCTIC ACTIVITIES Page 5

The USSR's plans for its Eighth Antarctic Expedition, 1962-63, include extensive preparations for the International Year of the Quiet Sun, a year of world-wide scientific cooperation planned for 1964-65. In addition to annual restaffing and resupply of Soviet Antarctic stations, a former year-round scientific station will be reopened, a new one established, and another permanent geophysical observatory constructed. Studies in atmospheric physics will be further emphasized. Polish scientists will return to Antarctica after an absence of three years.

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UGANDA Page 8

The British protectorate of Uganda becomes independent on 9 October in an atmosphere of racial harmony and economic well-being relatively high by East African standards. The coalition government of Prime Minister Obote nevertheless faces substantial problems in overcoming deep tribal differences which constitute the largest single barrier to the country's political stability. Obote will probably follow a moderate neutralist line in international relations and avoid for the time being closer ties with the more extremist states of Africa.

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BRIEFS

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****WEEKLY REVIEW****SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS****Berlin and Germany**

The Soviet Union continued to play the Berlin and German questions in low key during the past week, reflecting Moscow's apparent decision to defer any new moves to bring the issues to a head at least until mid-November. During his official visit to Yugoslavia, Soviet President Brezhnev has reiterated Moscow's standard themes on Berlin and Germany and has attempted to leave the impression that Yugoslavia's attitude toward these issues is the same as the Soviet Union's.

In his 27 September speech at Split, Brezhnev did not allude to the German question until the end of his address and the only in moderate terms--as he did throughout his trip to Yugoslavia. He emphasized the need for settling international problems through "sensible realistic talks." Brezhnev then drew the conclusion that the USSR's "struggle to conclude a German peace treaty" was convincing proof that negotiations were the correct approach to the solution of urgent problems.

Soviet reaction to Secretary McNamara's 28 September press conference reflected Moscow's sensitivity to statements regarding the Western powers' readiness to use force to maintain their position in Berlin and to the possibility of West Germany's acquiring a nuclear capability.

A 3 October article by Polyanov, Izvestia's authoritative commentator on Berlin

and German affairs, stressed the standard line that Western "saber-rattling" will make no impression on the USSR and that Soviet forces have "powerful means to administer a crushing rebuff to the aggressors." Polyanov also renewed previous warnings that any "showdown" over West Berlin initiated by the West could escalate into a general nuclear conflict.

Izvestia concluded by emphasizing that Moscow will not allow its "initiative" to sign a German peace treaty to be "stopped halfway." It reaffirmed the USSR's preference for a negotiated settlement, but warned that there is a "time limit" to Soviet patience. It said that if the US refuses to engage in "reasonable" talks and continues its "saber-rattling," the USSR will proceed with the separate treaty.

The Soviet press claimed that McNamara's recent inspection trip to West Germany provided further evidence that the "nuclear rocket arming" of West Germany is continuing at "full speed" and that the "West German brass virtually already have atomic bombs."

Soviet spokesmen at the UN have told US officials that the Berlin question will be settled, "one way or the other," by the end of 1962. However, they stop short of a flat prediction that a peace treaty will be signed by that time. They have asserted that an "agreed solution" on Berlin can be reached only if "one does not miss possibilities and opportunities that present themselves." They have cited the presence of Western forces and the occupation status of West Berlin as the main unresolved issues.

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The forthcoming visit to East Germany of Polish party chief Gomulka may be timed to coincide with the 7 October celebrations of the 13th anniversary of the founding of the GDR. The occasion could be used for a gathering of high-level bloc leaders designed to emphasize their solidarity with the Ulbricht regime and to restate the bloc's position on Berlin and a peace treaty.

In a front-page editorial on 30 September, the authoritative East German Neues Deutschland elaborated on the "pause" in negotiations for a German peace settlement. This editorial, the first extensive East German comment on the 11 September TASS statement noting the existence of such a "pause," echoed similar remarks by Ulbricht in urging that the West use the time to create "favorable conditions" for a resumption of negotiations. The editorial argued that a policy of peaceful coexistence is the only sensible approach for West Germany to take and urged the Western powers to be "smart" enough to accelerate the pace of the discussions with the USSR.

A 28 September Pravda article underscored a sharp attack on Adenauer with the accusation that Bonn was attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the three Allied powers. In contrast to Moscow's recent bitter attack on De Gaulle, which by implication played down Moscow's hopes for obtaining any four-power settlement on Berlin in the foreseeable future, the article asserted that the Soviet Union wished to solve the German problem "through negotiations with all states concerned." Pravda reiterated the line recently taken by a public lecturer in Moscow and declared that a German peace settlement is a complicated problem and that "no one believes that it is easy to solve."

Nuclear Test Ban

Khrushchev on 1 October received a delegation from the Gandhi Peace Foundation of India. He used the occasion to reiterate Moscow's standard positions on a nuclear test ban, including Soviet willingness to accept the memorandum of the eight nonaligned powers as the basis for a solution. During the meeting he in effect rejected the idea of a unilateral moratorium on testing if no agreement is reached.

At Geneva, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin continued to berate the US and British delegates to the test-ban subcommittee and to denounce the two Western draft treaties. On 27 September he said that in the Soviet view there was no desire on the part of the West to reach agreement and that continued talking was not producing results. Tsarapkin's negative stand suggests that Moscow may be considering a move to recess the subcommittee when the UN General Assembly takes up the test-ban question.


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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN SITUATION**

Soviet military personnel are continuing the construction of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and coastal defense cruise missile installations in Cuba. Fourteen SAM sites now have

partially operational. Others are very probably being built in strategic locations elsewhere along the coast.



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been identified, and equipment for a fifteenth has been located near Santiago de Cuba. Others are almost certainly being established, particularly in Camaguey and Oriente provinces. Twenty-four SAM sites would give complete air defense coverage of the island.

Three cruise missile coastal defense sites have been identified. They are located at Banes, in Oriente Province; at Santa Cruz del Norte, in Havana Province; and near Sigüanea Bay on the Isle of Pines. The one at Banes is believed to be

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However, most if not all of the more sophisticated weapons that have been delivered to Cuba will probably have to be manned by Soviet military specialists pending the training of Cuban personnel in their use. The SAM sites will almost certainly be manned by Soviet personnel for at least nine to twelve months after training of Cuban personnel begins. There is no evidence that such training has started.

Soviet Propaganda

Cuba has remained a major topic in Soviet broadcasts, with attention centered on US efforts to "pressure" Latin American states into taking joint action against the Castro regime. Latin American countries were said to oppose the establishment of a military organization in the Caribbean because they view it as a potential threat to themselves.

Moscow claimed there is a general belief that "massing of armed force in the area could accidentally set off the spark of war, or it could be used as cover for a deliberate provocation leading to a major conflict." In view of this opposition, said Moscow, Washington now is advancing a plan for increased air and sea surveillance in the Caribbean--which is "equally aggressive and equally dangerous." The commentary concluded, however, that the US "backstage maneuvers" and the decisions of the OAS meeting "will never come to anything."

The Soviet press revealed sensitivity to Western criticism of the Soviet-Cuban fishing port agreement by stressing that it is a "mutually profitable agreement." General references were made to Soviet-Cuban cooperation in the field of maritime fishing, to mutual consultations on questions relative to the fishing industry, and to coordination of activities in research on fishing conditions in the Atlantic.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****COMMUNIST CHINA CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY**

Peiping introduced a note of restrained optimism at its 13th anniversary celebrations on 1 October by implying that the economic decline of the last three years had reached bottom. The optimism may have been designed as reassurance to a nervous populace unsettled by the economic deterioration. The lack of supporting evidence in the form of figures or of future targets, however, suggests that the regime remains uncertain about its economic outlook.

The "slight gain" claimed for this year's summer harvest over last year's--which was unusually poor--suggests little improvement over the harvests of the past three years. In industry, output was said to be up over last year for agricultural equipment and materials, certain light industrial product, and "some" heavy industrial products. The communiqué of the tenth central committee plenum, released a few days before the National Day ceremonies, admitted incompetence and production declines in "some" factory and farm units, but stated that "many" enterprises had improved their management, raised the quality of their output, cut production costs, and improved labor productivity.

Policy guidance for the lagging economy was negligible, tending to follow the same lines laid down almost two years ago when the regime first called for retrenchment measures. The priority then accorded agriculture

is to continue, with the focus on boosting grain production. The whole nation is enjoined to give agriculture every "possible material, technical, and financial aid," and industrial departments are specifically reminded that their work must be readjusted to conform with the policy of making agriculture the foundation of the national economy.

Both the anniversary statements and the communiqué of the central committee plenum reflected Peiping's continuing concern over party loyalty and discipline, as well as the degree of mass support for the regime. People's Daily alluded to a "sharp struggle" during the past year against "rightist" elements who have sought to take advantage of mainland economic difficulties to attack the regime. The plenum's communiqué referred to revisionism and subversion in terms that implied the vulnerability of some party members to Soviet appeals. In this connection, the communiqué recalled that a challenge to party authority had been "victoriously smashed" at the party plenum in 1959. This plenum was followed by the purge of Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, who was reportedly in collusion with Moscow.

The central committee announced that the activities of the control commissions--the bodies responsible for party discipline--would be expanded. This concern about security in

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the party was also reflected in the addition of Lu Ting-i, Kang Sheng, and Lo Jui-ching to the secretariat of the central committee. Kang and Lo have had extensive experience in secret police, security, and intelligence work, while Lu's background is in propaganda indoctrination. Tan Cheng, a central committee member who has been inactive for some years, and Huang Ko-cheng, former chief of staff and follower of the purged Peng Te-huai, were dropped from the secretariat.

The Sino-Soviet dispute was reflected in Peiping's commentary on National Day, although both the Chinese and the Russians maintained the friendly protocol that customarily attends the holiday. This year's greetings from Khrushchev were perhaps a shade less cordial than last year's and ceremonies honoring the day in Moscow were

attended by a delegation from China.

Despite this facade, however, the Chinese used the occasion to express their opposition to Soviet foreign policies, in particular to the recent course of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. At the National Day ceremonies in Peiping, the Yugoslav chargé found the Chinese tirade against Belgrade so offensive that he demonstratively left the rostrum. The condemnation of Soviet policy was also evidenced in the opposition to the "chauvinism of a great country" expressed by the head of a Chinese delegation attending the ceremonies in Tirana. Recent Chinese commentary has indicated that this chauvinism is manifested in unfair pressure on other countries. The Chinese people, declared Chou En-lai at a National Day banquet, "will never submit to any pressure much less bargain away principles."

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NATIONALISM IN THE MONGOLIAN PARTY**

The purge on 10 September of D. Tomor-Ochir, top-level member of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, reflects the regime's continuing efforts to suppress Mongol nationalism. Tomor-Ochir was dropped from his politburo and central committee posts for "openly" striving to revise party decisions denouncing nationalism and for attempting to arouse "national passions." Party and state leader Tsedenbal's complete subservience to the Soviet Union has long irritated many Mongolians who still cherish the memory of Mongolian greatness under Genghis Khan and seek to preserve the country's national identity.

The party's recent campaign against the cult of personality, aimed at the deceased Mongolian premier, Choibalsan, has undoubtedly angered some Mongolians who see it as another example of Tsedenbal's slavish imitation of the USSR. The party central committee plenum which expelled Tomor-Ochir charged him with attempting to "undermine the authority of the party leadership"--a clear implication that he attacked Tsedenbal personally. According to an Ulan Bator press report, Tomor-Ochir committed "slandorous attacks" upon leading party and state cadres, "including members of the politburo."

This marks the second time Tomor-Ochir has been dropped from the politburo and the central committee secretariat. In July 1960 he was removed from both posts after having served in the secretariat for slightly more than two years and in the politburo for little more than one year. No reason was given for his 1960 dismissal and he was allowed to retain his membership on the central committee.

His return to prominence in January 1962, when he was once again elected to the politburo and secretariat, was as sudden and unexplained as had been his downfall.

The last major purge in the Mongolian party occurred in 1959 when former First Secretary Dashin Damba was expelled from the party. During his tenure as first secretary from 1954 to 1958, Damba attempted a cautious de-emphasis of the strong Soviet influence over Mongolian affairs. His willingness to oppose the pro-Soviet faction of the party and his desire to accommodate Mongolian characteristics in socializing the economy gave his struggle for personal power a distinctly nationalistic tone. It was during Damba's tenure that Chinese influence experienced a renaissance in Mongolia--a renaissance Damba may have welcomed, but only to the extent that it might in some degree offset Soviet control.

Tsedenbal--whose ambitious economic programs have been based on Soviet and Chinese aid--himself wavered briefly in his loyalty to the Soviet Union in 1960 when he tried to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, in the summer of that year he was summoned to Moscow, where apparently he was reminded that neutrality was a luxury he could not afford. Since that time Mongolia has become the Soviet Union's strongest and most vociferous supporter among the Asian bloc countries and has recently become the only Asian member of the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****WANING EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY**

In contrast to the success of the Common Market, the Coal-Steel Community (CSC)--the first of the three bodies set up by the six Common Market countries in their move toward economic integration--has become increasingly ineffective. The most recent symptom of the malaise affecting the CSC was the resignation on 25 September of Dirk Spierenburg, vice president and most energetic and capable member of the CSC's nine-man executive, the High Authority. He has been almost totally isolated from the other eight members, whose policies he regards as negative and uninspired.


The troubles of the High Authority go back at least to 1955, when Jean Monnet, the "father" of West European integration, resigned from the presidency to devote his efforts to furthering integration from private life. These troubles were aggravated in 1959, when the High Authority proved unable to come up with a plan acceptable to the six governments for solving Western Europe's "coal crisis" of overproduction and depression in producing areas. Since then, the High Authority has become increasingly cautious in exercising the powers given to it by the CSC treaty. The member governments, in turn, have appointed mediocre personnel and have often failed to support the High Authority and its staff.

In June 1962, the European Parliament almost voted to censure the High Authority, an action which would have forced the resignation of all nine members. The required two-thirds vote could not be obtained, however, and the parliament settled instead for a resolution by a simple majority criticizing

the High Authority for inaction and urging it to show greater initiative.

The High Authority's difficulties derive in part from the wavering support of some member countries for the supranational features of the CSC treaty. To a lesser extent, the EURATOM Commission has faced similar problems. The De Gaulle government in particular has tried to downgrade community institutions and stress the primacy of national governments. In early 1962, France forced the replacement of the EURATOM Commission's president, who in the opinion of the French Government suffered from an "excess of supranationality." The executive body of the most important European Community, the EEC, has so far remained relatively unscathed, in the face of such pressure, although some of its members have been criticized and belittled as "European functionaries."

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Another cause of the CSC's difficulties is the uncertainty over the future of the CSC as a separate organization. There is some feeling among the member states that the CSC has been superseded by, and should be merged into, the broader EEC. To replace Spierenburg, who has been the Dutch appointee on the High Authority, Foreign Minister Luns of the Netherlands reportedly favors choosing a middle-ranking official who could be easily removed if such a merger took place.

The continuing effort by the Common Market countries to work out a common energy policy

provides an additional element of uncertainty. The administration of a common policy would cut across all three communities and would require revision of the CSC treaty and the role of the High Authority.

The negotiations about to begin on Britain's application to join the CSC present at opportunity for the community to make a fresh approach to all these problems. The member states, however, will probably be unwilling to complicate the negotiations by raising the question of a basic revision of the CSC. 25X1

BONN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM

A special "stabilization program" to halt growing inflationary trends is to be presented by the West German Government to the Bundestag when it reconvenes on 9 October. The program, which is also designed to strengthen Economics Minister Erhard's claim to succeed Chancellor Adenauer, has as its major feature an "absolute" ceiling on the 1963 budget of \$14.2 billion. This would necessitate reductions in some fields such as housing, and allow little or no expansion in others such as agriculture, transport, and labor.

A tentative ceiling on the total defense budget of \$4.25

billion--although an increase of half a billion dollars above last year's--may force postponement or cancellation of some defense programs, including some arms purchases already on order from the US.

Other features of the program include curtailment of the current public and private building boom by cutting federal and state outlays for housing and by the removal of tax incentives. Labor leaders are also to be urged to moderate wage demands.

The anti-inflation argument for the new stabilization

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program seems exaggerated in view of the basically healthy state of the West German economy, and its appearance at this time owes much to political forces. In recent months, Erhard, supported by the coalition Free Democratic Party (FDP) and especially Finance Minister Starke, has attempted to hold the line in various major wage disputes, only to be overridden by the chancellor. Bitter resentment in the FDP over Adenauer's actions at one point reportedly threatened the coalition itself, and the issue of government spending clearly remains a potential source of trouble.

After many months of vigorous warnings and exhortations, Erhard finds himself under pressure for dramatic government action, and failure to put over his economic policy could cause his support among the politicians in the Christian Democratic Union to drop sharply. Adenauer has reluctantly

gone along with the retrenchment program, although he now is claiming it as his own in an effort to reduce the role of Erhard, whom he opposes as his successor.

Considerable opposition to this financially conservative program may be forthcoming. The ministers of housing, transport, and labor are reported to be "extremely unhappy" at the restrictions on their budgets. Pressures to exceed the set limitations could become quite strong, making it difficult for the government to hold the line by cuts in other areas such as foreign aid. Although the budget includes a provision for a \$125 million increase in Bonn's development aid funds, this figure is regarded as only tentative and does not necessarily imply a larger program, since a higher disbursement level is required for 1963 merely to cover existing obligations.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN**

The 1962 French delegation at the United Nations can be expected to display greater tactical flexibility than its recent predecessors, but it will still be circumscribed by De Gaulle's basic view that the UN should be no more than an international debating society. France probably will not comply with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding extraordinary UN expenses, nor will it press its influence with the French-speaking African countries on issues where French interests are not clearly at stake.

De Gaulle and other French officials believe that the UN is fast reaching a dangerous point where the major countries, whose power should determine international equilibrium, are consistently outvoted by the numerous smaller countries. They feel that too much power has been delegated to the General Assembly and the Secretary General in derogation of the Security Council, where major powers play the decisive role. Such activities as the UN's Congo venture are considered "irresponsible" and illegal.

De Gaulle gave acting Secretary General Thant no encouragement in their recent Paris conversations to expect that France might abide by the ICJ advisory opinion--which in effect classifies special expenses, like those of the UN forces in the Middle East and the Congo, as regular UN outlays, the assessments for which must be paid by all UN members. While De Gaulle has honored the commitment initiated under the Fourth Republic to share the cost of the UN force in the

Middle East, he has refused to pay for any part of the Congo operation.

The French position--like that of the USSR--is that the UN does not have the power of levy on sovereign members for operations they do not approve. French officials have indicated, however, that France does not want to be publicly associated with the USSR on this matter and will abstain when a vote is taken to endorse the ICJ opinion.

France does attach importance to the UN as a place to meet with the twelve French-speaking African states of the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) and influence their position on international issues. The voting power of the UAM is important to the West because it is a relatively cohesive group which French leadership conceivably might sway on many cold war issues. An official in the UN office of the French Foreign Ministry recently told Ambassador Gavin that Paris would press this group and other former French-African territories to forestall irresponsible action in the General Assembly.

While this official thought France could be of a restraining influence on cold war matters than on colonial questions, it is probable Paris will be reluctant to dissipate its influence on UN issues where French prestige is not directly engaged. The recent decision of the UAM member states to vote against inscription of the Hungarian question on the 1962 agenda probably resulted in part from the failure of the French to press the Western viewpoint.

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
The situation in Yemen remains critical. Fighting between rebel army forces and tribal elements loyal to the monarchy seems increasingly likely. Although the revolutionary government is in control in the major towns of Sana, Taizz, and Hudaydah, where most elements support the revolution, it is encountering opposition in the northern province around the town of Hajjah and Sadah and in the south in the Bayda area on the Aden Protectorate border. The rebel regime has appealed to both Iraq and the UAR for military equipment, including aircraft, and the UAR may have responded already.

Prince Hasan, the claimant to the Yemeni Imamate, has arrived on the Saudi-Yemeni border where he is attempting to rally his tribal supporters for a counterrevolt.

Hasan has the backing of the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian governments. Radio Amman is giving him propaganda support, describing the rebel leaders as "mutineers" and claiming that tribes loyal to the monarchy are marching on Sana.

Hasan may also be hoping to obtain a certain amount of support from the British, who are concerned over the effect the Yemeni revolt will have on the native population of neighboring Aden Colony.

The rebel leadership has announced the formation of a government composed of a Revolutionary Command Council--the



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highest authority--a cabinet, and a Republican Presidential Council. Brigadier Abdullah al-Sallal, who engineered the coup, heads the Revolutionary Command Council and is prime minister.

The regime is looking to Egypt for guidance as well as protection. The governmental structure closely parallels Egypt's, and at least two members of the cabinet, in addition to the deputy premier, have been leaders of the Egyptian-backed Free Yemeni Movement and were residing in Cairo at the time of the coup.

The new regime has also been seeking diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia have extended recognition.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE SITUATION IN LAOS**

With the approach of the 7 October deadline for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel, there are continuing indications that the North Vietnamese are planning to retain at least some elements in Laos to bolster the Pathet Lao forces.

Premier Souvanna appears to be increasingly concerned over this prospect

over airlift operations in Laos, on 1 October requested air support from both the US and the USSR. The USSR has agreed to provide the Souvanna government with an unspecified number of aircraft and crews to be used in supplying outlying areas.

Souvanna remains suspicious of Thai and Chinese Nationalist intentions. On 29 September he indicated to Ambassador Unger that if Nationalist forces remained in Laos it might be necessary to take military action against them.

Souvanna, meanwhile, has persuaded North Vietnam to delay sending its ambassador to Vientiane. He took this action to give South Vietnam an opportunity to work out an arrangement which would obviate Saigon's threatened break in relations with Laos. Souvanna says, however, that the present situation cannot continue indefinitely and that the North Vietnamese ambassador "must" be allowed to present his credentials.

Preliminary arrangements for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with East Germany appear under way. The Laotian Foreign Ministry has prepared a letter to the King requesting approval of the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ministerial level. Establishment of such relations in all likelihood would cause West Germany to withdraw its representation.

Souvanna, apparently anxious to achieve centralized control

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO**

Virtually no progress has been made on implementation of the UN reconciliation plan, and UN officials are beginning to consider ways of breaking the impasse.

The joint Leopoldville-Elisabethville commissions on revenue, foreign exchange, and military integration which have been meeting in Elisabethville are clearly headed for a rupture. The Katangans insist they accepted the UN plan only in principle and that detailed discussion of the various issues must precede implementation of the UN plans. Central government representatives on the other hand maintain that they are there not to negotiate, but to draw up the steps of implementation.

Tshombé insists that Katanga's financial needs must be met before any funds are shared, and that Katanga's military integration must be preceded by a cease-fire, a pull-back of UN forces, the removal of UN roadblocks, and the withdrawal of the Congo Army from Katanga. Although discussions are apparently going to continue, UN and Leopoldville officials doubt that any progress will be made.

This impasse is almost certainly related to Leopoldville's efforts to use military pressure to detach northern Katanga from Tshombé, and to Adoula's continuing rejection of Tshombé's request for discussions on the new constitution. The draft constitution was presented to Adoula on 26 September and is now under study by the cabinet and parliamentary committees. Tshombé wrote US Consul Dean on the same day that he was ready to make concessions "in the widest possible degree" but charged that Leopoldville had "no more desire for a dialogue on the constitution than it did for a detente in the military field."

Adoula apparently does not intend to see if Tshombé would in fact make any concessions. He has categorically rejected US and UN suggestions that he grant Tshombé's request, reiterating that Katanga must take its chances like the

other provinces. Adoula told US officials that Tshombé either accepted the UN plan or he did not, and if not, he had no recourse but to ask the UN to withdraw and permit Leopoldville to carry out its own plans.

UN officials in the Congo and in New York appear convinced that Tshombé has no intention of implementing the UN plan. UN chief representative Gardiner has been ordered to meet with Tshombé to try to determine his intentions, and UN officials are again considering ways to mount economic pressure on Katanga. Plans are under way to try to get Union Miniere to pay its export taxes to the central government.

Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, while willing to press for economic sanctions against Tshombé, fears that they are likely to result in bloodshed and might force an evacuation of the 17,000 Belgian citizens from Katanga. In that event, he says Brussels could not "pour even more money" into the Congo, especially when additional financial aid would only make Adoula feel even less inclined to consult with Tshombé on the constitution. 25X1

Tshombé gives every indication that he expects a renewal of fighting.

Meanwhile, Adoula, over the objections of General Mobutu, set in motion his long-contemplated plan to move against South Kasai and secessionist "King" Albert Kalonji, who had escaped from a Leopoldville jail on 7 September. Kalonji and his cohorts were arrested on 30 September, and forces loyal to the central government appear to be in control of his capital at Bakwanga. If the central government can maintain its control in South Kasai, Adoula will have blocked a potential line-up of Kalonji with Tshombé, and he will have reasserted Leopoldville's control of Kasai's^{25X1} diamond mining revenues, which approach \$40 million annually.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NEW ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT**

A substantial opposition to Ben Bella and his government is already developing within the Algerian Constituent Assembly, which convened on 25 September. This faction, drawn mainly from tribal elements, is led by Hussein Ait Ahmed, a Kabyle Berber who was imprisoned with Ben Bella in France for over five years.

In the vote on 26 September on Ben Bella's premiership, over a quarter of the assembly's 194 members either opposed him or abstained. Two other members elected to the assembly on 20 September had already resigned. In a maneuver to prevent Ben Bella from acquiring uncontested personal power, the opposition had him "designated" rather than "invested" as premier--a tactical success with little practical effect.

The premier picked up a number of votes when his 19-member government was approved on 29 September. The opposition nevertheless partially thwarted efforts of assembly President Ferhat Abbas to limit debate. The opposition may cause increasing

trouble in coming weeks when the government presents its legislative program, and later when a constitution is drafted.

Although Ben Bella failed to silence the opposition by obtaining the participation in the government of his leading critics, he is assured military support. Four members of the Algerian Army general staff hold ministerial portfolios, including Colonel Boumedienne, the minister of defense. Ben Bella has secured some breadth of representation by including in the political bureau--which parallels the cabinet--a minor member of Ben Khedda's provisional Algerian government and a secretary to Abderrahmane Fares, head of the former Provisional Executive.

Ben Bella assured the assembly of his intentions to move forward in fields of national economy, agriculture, education, and national defense. He can, therefore, be expected to be receptive to crash programs proffered by any source.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS WORSEN**

Relations between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia have worsened recently following an increase in the tempo of charges and countercharges between the two countries. Diplomatic ties may be broken, and armed clashes are possible.


Prime Minister Abdirascid announced in late September that Somali police officials had foiled an Ethiopian attempt to assassinate Somali President Aden and the minister of interior.

Ethiopian security forces can be expected to pursue any Somali insurgents across the frontier.

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Radio Mogadiscio has continued to spout anti-Ethiopian propaganda.

Abdirascid has sought to divert attention from the country's internal problems by focusing attention on the achievement of popular national goals such as the creation of a Greater Somalia. This concept envisages incorporating under Mogadiscio's control all Somali-populated areas--including eastern Ethiopia and part of Kenya and French Somaliland. All other countries involved oppose this. Ethiopia recently showed its determination to retain control over its Somali-inhabited Ogaden area by announcing a plan to construct a jet air base there. Somali officials claim this is part of an Ethiopian military build-up for an invasion of Somalia.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****LEGALIST FACTION ASSERTS CONTROL IN ARGENTINA**

The Legalist, or constitutionalist, military faction-- army, air force, and some lower grade naval officers who support early elections with Peronist participation--now is in firm control of the Argentine Government. The capability of the rival "golpista" generals--those advocating a hard line toward the Peronists--to attempt an immediate comeback has been lessened by the arrest and detention of their principal "golpista" leaders and the replacement of "hard-line" officers in key command positions by those loyal to the new military leadership.

No decision has been made as to the disposition of the "golpista" generals, although it is anticipated that no drastic action will be taken against them.

Similarly, cabinet ministers thought to be sympathetic to the "hard-line" faction have been purged. To date, President Guido has not appointed new ministers of foreign relations, interior, or defense. Dr. Miguel Sussini continues as acting foreign minister, and Economy Minister Alvaro Alsogaray as acting interior minister. Alsogaray, by virtue of his dual role, is the civilian spokesman for the Legalist forces and is in effect the prime minister of Argentina.

The present military leaders must maintain unity within their own faction and find an accept-

able and workable formula for Peronist participation in forthcoming elections if they are to remain in power and prevent a repetition of military clashes. The Legalist faction is a loosely knit group of senior military officers whose adherents represent almost every hue of Argentine political ideology and who have varying solutions for the country's political and economic problems.

One element of the Legalist faction, the so-called "nationalists," composed mostly of junior-grade officers, is recognized by the present leadership as a possible future problem. Measures are being taken to ensure that this element does not get out of hand. Gen. Carlos Jorge Rosas, titular head of the "nationalists," has been appointed commander of the 3rd Army Corps in San Luis

The government is optimistic that it can promulgate adequate laws and decrees prior to elections to enable the Peronists to voice their opinion without allowing them to gain any important position of power in the next government. For the moment, the government intends to allow the Peronist masses as wide a measure of freedom as possible. Despite their strong belief in democratic principles, however, the Legalists are not purists and would have no qualms about using their military force to "defend democracy" again if the Peronists appeared to be gaining the upper hand.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS**

At stake in the national elections scheduled for 7 October in Brazil are 11 governorships, two thirds of the Senate seats, and all 409 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as a considerable number of lesser state offices.

The gubernatorial contests are probably the most important. Governors in Brazil have considerable independent authority, including that of negotiating with bloc governments for economic aid. Preliminary indications are that as many as seven governorships could be won by anti-US candidates.

The three most significant of the gubernatorial contests are probably those in Pernambuco, the most important state in Brazil's impoverished northeast; in Sao Paulo, the industrial heart of Brazil; and in Rio Grande do Sul, which is the home state of leftist President Goulart and of his demagogic, anti-US brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, the incumbent governor.

In Pernambuco, pro-Communist Miguel Arraes, who is well liked and is just finishing his term as mayor of the state capital, is running against conservative Jao Cleophas. Early straw polls indicated that 70 percent of the voters favored Arraes over Cleophas, who is closely associated with unpopular sugar interests long dominant in the state's economy. Arraes' campaign has since run into difficulties

largely because of effective opposition from local business and Catholic Church leaders, who have emphasized his Communist connections. In addition, revelations of dishonesty and inefficiency in Arraes' administration as mayor have impaired his appeal as an administrator. This race is nevertheless expected to be close.

In Sao Paulo, former President Janio Quadros is in a three-way contest with a corrupt, pro-US machine politician and a capable but colorless protégé of the incumbent pro-US governor. The governor, who cannot succeed himself under Brazilian law, has campaigned wholeheartedly for his protégé, but Quadros and the machine politician, Adhemar de Barros, apparently have an edge. The Communists are not supporting any of the three candidates, although Quadros has veered to the left in the past year and evidenced hostility to the US during his period as president.

In Rio Grande do Sul, there are three important candidates all of whom are more conservative than incumbent Governor Brizola. However, a victory for Egidio Michaelson, candidate of Goulart's Labor Party, would strengthen Goulart and enhance the reputation of Brizola. It now seems likely that Michaelson may be defeated either by a colorless conservative named Meneghetti or by Goulart's

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long-time enemy, leftist non-Communist Fernando Ferrari.

Candidates of the extreme left appear to have an even chance in Rio de Janeiro State and Sergipe. Their prospects seem poorer in Bahai and Ceara. In the remaining four gubernatorial contests, all the leading candidates appear friendly to the US.

Leftists are expected to make a few gains in elections for the Senate. In 14 of 22 states, all leading candidates are centrists or conservatives. Only Piaui--poorest of all Brazilian states--and Rio de Janeiro are likely to elect extremists. In Pernambuco, a millionaire industrialist associated with pro-Communist Arraes has a fair chance of success, while crypto-Communist Djalma Maranhao, mayor of Natal, could win an upset victory.

In the Chamber of Deputies, extreme leftists are expected to increase their strength from 22 percent in the present body to 24-30 percent in the new Chamber. Two of the contests have particular interest. Leonel Brizola, who is seeking leadership of the leftist ultranationalists, is running for federal



deputy from Guanabara, and is seemingly certain to win heavily. Peasant League leader Francisco Juliao is running for federal deputy from Pernambuco. He is not considered an effective political figure and, should he win, his victory could be attributed to the volume of publicity which has surrounded the northeast's Peasant Leagues in recent years. A defeat for Juliao would be a considerable bloc to Communist hopes of extending their influence in the rural areas of the northeast.

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TRENDS IN TRINIDAD AND JAMAICA

Political ferment has increased in both Jamaica and Trinidad since they became independent of Britain in August. While both are basically aligned with the West, some contradictory trends in their foreign policies have developed, particularly regarding the US and Cuba.

On 21 September, Prime Minister Williams reiterated the charge that the US has not fulfilled its aid obligations under the 1961 Defense Areas Agreement by which the US retains the Chaguaramas naval base and radar research facility until 1977. Williams' interpretation of the agreement is that it commits the US to finance completely almost any project Trinidad decides is worthwhile. His accumulated aid demands total more than \$130 million. Acting Prime Minister Solomon's repetition of Williams' charges on 24 September suggests that Trinidad may be beginning a new pressure campaign for more aid and renegotiation of the agreement.

In any case, Williams probably finds this issue useful in rallying domestic political support. He apparently does not wish to eliminate the base. A recent press editorial implying that there is a need to keep Chaguaramas as a US base because of the USSR's support for Cuba is believed to reflect the majority view in Trinidad.

Rumors continue to circulate that Williams may retire from active politics in favor of Solomon. [REDACTED]

Solomon could keep the governing party together "not from popularity but through adroitness" despite the disunity known to exist within the cabinet. Solomon has a reputation as a racist, however, which would revive old tensions between the governing Negro party and the East Indian minority.

Since independence Prime Minister Bustamante's government in Jamaica has been increasingly criticized as disunited and for refusing to debate important issues. The US Embassy notes that tension has also risen within the governing party, largely because of the maneuvers of the aging prime minister's subordinates, who are looking ahead to the time of his retirement. The embassy considers that the fears of a right-wing dictatorship expressed by Bustamante's opponents are unwarranted. Despite the heightened political activity, there is little likelihood of a change of government for some time.

In foreign affairs, both countries now are UN members and are moving cautiously with regard to other affiliations. Jamaica is anxious to join the Organization of American States, but Trinidad is adopting a wait-and-see attitude, partly because Williams sees little advantage in participation. With respect to the Common Market, Williams has expressed interest in acquiring associated status for Trinidad, whereas Jamaica has reserved its position.

Neither government has responded to Cuban overtures for full diplomatic relations. Jamaica's attitude has been affected by the detection of attempts by the Cuban Consulate in Jamaica to circulate Castro propaganda. These activities by the Cubans could have a substantial inflammatory effect on local malcontents. Jamaica's hesitation stems also from concern over the possible complications that can arise over the more than 25,000 Jamaican nationals resident in Cuba. The principal factor in Trinidad's attitude appears to be Prime Minister Williams' avowed anti-Communism. [REDACTED]

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**SPECIAL ARTICLES**NORTH KOREAN FACTIONALISM AND THE RISE OF KIM IL-SUNG**

North Korea's state and party chief Kim Il-sung, an obscure officer of the Soviet Army in 1945, today holds a position of absolute power in his own country. His rise was due mainly to a ruthless determination and an uncanny instinct for political intrigue which served him well in the Korean Workers Party, one of the world's most faction-ridden Communist movements. Kim not only prefers a Stalinesque role, he needs it to maintain his position in the jungle of Korean politics.

Kim's Background

Kim Il-sung was born on 15 April 1912 in the town of Mang-yongdae, near Pyongyang, and was given the name Kim Song-chu. When Kim was in his teens, his family moved north, across the China border. It was in this area that he began his career as an anti-Japanese partisan.

Exactly what part Kim played in the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese may never be known because of the deliberate fiction created by Soviet authorities in 1945 identifying Kim Song-chu with a much older partisan hero named Kim Il-sung, who had died several years earlier. In official Communist accounts, Kim Il-sung is credited with founding the anti-Japanese partisan movement in 1932.

Whatever his role may have been in the guerrilla movement, Kim Il-sung, the former Kim Song-chu, was a relatively unknown junior officer when he arrived in Korea with the Soviet occupation forces in 1945. Soviet military authorities moved quickly to establish their control over North Korea and to this end they used trusted Korean nationals within their own army.

Apparently the most manageable of these Soviet-trained Korean Communists was Kim Il-sung, the man selected as puppet leader of North Korea.

Factionalism in the Party

In 1945 Kim Il-sung faced the herculean task of hammering out a unified ruling elite from the traditionally disparate elements which made up the Communist movement in Korea. If he proved incapable of the task, there were others who could be selected by the Soviets to do the job. Internal disputes had split the ranks of the original Korean Communist Party so badly that the Comintern in 1928 ordered it dissolved. Pressure from Japanese occupation authorities drove many Korean revolutionaries to China and the Soviet Union, where they formed expatriate groups around strong personalities. Some remained in Korea to continue the struggle against Japanese rule from within. The result of this dispersion was pronounced factionalism which still existed in 1945 and 1946 when the various groups reunited in Pyongyang.

There were three major factions of Korean Communists in 1945. One was the result of a merger of two expatriate segments which had fled to Shanghai and Yenan respectively. This group came to be known as the Yenan faction. A second, known as the Soviet faction, was also an amalgam, comprised of Soviet citizens of Korean descent and members of Kim Il-sung's guerrilla band. These men and women were brought back to Korea as part of the Soviet army of occupation. A third, so-called domestic faction, consisted of those Communists who had remained in Korea during the Japanese occupation.

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Immediately after the defeat of Japan each of the three factions scrambled to set up its own organization in Korea. Kim Il-sung, directed by the Soviet Army, moved to integrate the three factions under his leadership. His first step was to establish control over the sources of power in North Korea--the police and the army. Kim's close companions, Choe Yong-kon and Kim Il, were put in command of the army and of army political affairs respectively. A Soviet-trained North Korean was given control of the security police.

By 8 September 1948 the Soviet faction had established a firm enough hold on administrative matters to enable it to form a government with Kim Il-sung as premier. Soon afterward, the Soviet Army was withdrawn from North Korea. One year later the South Korean Workers Party was merged with its northern counterpart to form the Korean Workers Party, with Kim Il-sung as chairman. Although Kim was unquestionably a straw man for the Soviet authorities, he had visions of himself as the absolute ruler of Korea, in the image of Josef Stalin. With this goal before him Kim began to maneuver his rivals into positions of weakness.

The Purges Begin

The first man to fall prey to Kim's ambition was Mu Chong --the leader of the Yenan faction and a man whose following in the Korean military made him too dangerous to be allowed to hold even a minor post in the party or government. Kim had used Mu Chong to help recruit and train the fledgling

Korean army in 1946, but by 1949 he had edged Mu Chong out of the top level of the party hierarchy and removed him from the high command of the army he had helped create. Once separated from these sources of power and prestige, he was easily purged. When Mu Chong differed with the premier over military tactics during the first year of the Korean War, Kim bitterly denounced him at a party conference, blaming him for North Korea's defeats. Mu Chong was purged from the party and died in disgrace several years later.

Encouraged by his success in destroying this dangerous rival, Kim Il-sung next turned his attention to his own Soviet-guerrilla faction, where Ho Ka-i, an ambitious party organizer from the Soviet Union, was building a following. In 1951 Kim removed Ho from the post of party secretary general and made him deputy premier in charge of home affairs. This not only removed Ho from his powerful party position but gave him the insuperable task of solving the food crisis brought on by the war devastation. By 1953 it was clear that Ho had failed to fulfill his assignment. Kim Il-sung launched a campaign of vituperation against Ho, charging him with gross inefficiency and anti-party activity. Ho Ka-i committed suicide.

It was becoming clear that those Korean Communists who opposed Kim's one-man rule would either have to overthrow him or be purged themselves. In December 1952 Kim had warned the central committee that "much filth remained to be cleansed from the party." Shortly afterward, one of the

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most popular Communists in Korea disappeared from public view. This was Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the domestic faction, a vice premier, foreign minister, and former chairman of the South Korean Workers Party.

Rumors of a purge of the domestic faction filtered out of North Korea during the first six months of 1953. On 7 August radio Pyongyang announced the arrest of twelve government and party leaders. These persons, comprising the backbone of the domestic faction, were charged with conspiracy to revolt, engaging in espionage for the US Army, and plotting with Pak Hon-yong to organize a new regime and party. Ten of the twelve were executed, and two were given lengthy sentences.

Pak Hon-yong lost his government posts in 1953 but was not brought to trial until December 1955, after nearly three years of political oblivion. By associating Pak with the other twelve and by charging them all with treason, Kim was able to destroy the reputation of this veteran Communist. So well did Kim manage this campaign that when Pak's execution finally took place, it passed almost unnoticed in North Korea.

With the elimination of Pak Hon-yong, the only man of any stature remaining in North Korea to challenge Kim Il-sung was Kim Tu-pong, the elderly titular President of the country, a leader of the Yen-an faction, and the number-two man in the politburo. Kim Il-sung began laying the groundwork for Kim Tu-pong's downfall by dropping two of the old revolutionary's close associates from the inner circle of the party hierarchy. Beginning in 1954 these two men,

Choe Chang-ik and Pak Chang-ok, found themselves left out of important policy discussions, even though both were politburo members. In January 1956 Pak was accused in the press of "improper acts" and "reprehensible conduct." At the third party congress, in April 1956, he was stripped of his politburo rank.

Coup Attempt

Choe and Pak eagerly seized upon Khrushchev's denunciation of the cult of Stalin in February 1956 as justification for an attempt to overthrow Kim Il-sung, who was vulnerable to the charge of promoting his own personality cult. Several other high-level party and government leaders joined the plot during the first few months of 1956. The try for Kim was made at a party plenum in August 1956. However, the conspirators had not prepared the rank-and-file central committee members for this sudden attack on their leader, perhaps out of fear the plan would be revealed. The coup failed for lack of support within the central committee, and Choe and Pak were expelled from the party along with the other members of the conspiracy.

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and Choe were reinstated on the central committee but were given only minor bureaucratic posts, while the other conspirators were "returned to party life."

Total Victory

The first man to feel Kim's anger was Kim Tu-pong, who was purged from his party and government posts in early 1957 for supporting Choe and Pak. One year later, when Kim Il-sung felt certain that he had uncovered all those associated with the coup attempt, he struck again, this time purging not only Pak Chang-ok and Choe Chang-ik but scores of others as well. Kim's delayed but thorough purge was soon expanded to oust from the top ranks of the party all who had failed to give enthusiastic support to him and his policies.

His total victory over the opposition was celebrated at the fourth party congress in September 1961. Politburo member Pak Kum-chol told the congress that the purges of August 1956 and March 1958 had "rooted out sec-

tarianism," which he called "an ulcer in the development of the party." Pak warned the party against ideological elements which in the future "might become the hotbed of sectarianism."

At this party congress, the first held since April 1956, Kim's men took over all the leading positions in the party, replacing those who had been involved in the 1956 plot or who had otherwise offended his ego. Yim Hae, who is believed to have advocated policies objectionable to Kim, lost his politburo post, and some 75 members were dropped from the central committee. Kim Il-sung made his control over that body unquestioned by having 96 new central committee members elected.

Encouraged by his successes in the 1957-1961 purges, Pyongyang's premier allowed his henchmen full rein in exalting the cult of Kim. He told a party plenum in November 1961 that de-Stalinization was the internal problem of the Soviet Communist Party and had "nothing to do with our party."

Today, any group that may contemplate ousting Kim Il-sung faces an opponent who has proved himself a master of intrigue, political maneuver, and counter-coup plotting in the political jungle of Korean and international communism. He has developed to an art the technique of acquiring and perpetuating his control over the sources of power in North Korea. With North Korea firmly under his thumb, Kim Il-sung appears, at present, to be safe from a coup attempt. However, judging from the history of the Korean Workers Party, he cannot afford any unguarded moments.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOVIET ANTARCTIC ACTIVITIES**

The USSR's plans for its Eighth Antarctic Expedition, 1962-63, include extensive preparations for the International Year of the Quiet Sun (IQSY), a year of world-wide scientific cooperation planned for 1964-65. This early emphasis on preparations--to be supervised by the top Soviet Antarctic expert, M. M. Somov--indicates that the USSR will participate as extensively as it did in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 1957-58.

Somov, deputy director of the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute of the Northern Sea Route Administration, is to head this year's expedition. He led the First Soviet Antarctic Expedition, 1955-56, which located the site and began establishment of the USSR's present geophysical observatory at Mirnyy.

The IQSY program has been formulated by the International Geophysical Committee (CIG) to conduct world-wide observations during a period of minimum solar activity. Such observations are necessary to complement the IGY observations conducted during the period of maximum solar activity. The IQSY will include observation in the disciplines of geomagnetism, aurora and airglow, ionospheric physics, aeronomy, cosmic rays, space research, and solar activity.

The scientific vessel Ob and the supply vessel Kooperatsiya are scheduled to leave Leningrad for the Antarctic in late October or early November, carrying supplies, equipment, two single-engine fixed-wing aircraft, and a helicopter. Some scientific personnel and equipment will be brought in by air if arrangements can be made with Australia and New Zealand for stopovers. Such flights were made last year by an AN-10 (Cat) and an IL-18 (Coot). The USSR has again asked permission from Australia to fly from Perth, a

route which would permit more direct flight to Mirnyy. If this is refused, as it was last year, Soviet planes would have to use the longer route through New Zealand and US facilities at McMurdo.

The former year-round station at Vostok is to be reopened this year, and a new one is to be added at Molodezhnaya on the Enderby Coast. The ones at Mirnyy and Novolazaryevskaya will continue in operation. Summer research will also be resumed at Komsomolskaya.


In addition to the previous basic research program in meteorology, glaciology, geology, geodesy, and gravimetry, increased emphasis is to be given to studies in atmospheric physics--aurora, geomagnetism, ionospheric physics--as required for the IQSY program. This program also emphasizes upper atmosphere observations from rockets and satellites, but the Soviets have not announced plans for use of rockets in any part of their IQSY program. During the 1957-58 season, the USSR launched two dozen rockets to altitudes up to 50 miles from the Ob while it was making an oceanographic cruise in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Oceanographic observations this year will be conducted offshore between Mirnyy and Novolazaryevskaya, and a detailed survey will be made of the zone of the Antarctic Convergence--a zone between 0° and 100° E. in which a rapid rise of surface temperatures occurs within a very short distance.

The emphasis on IQSY observations in the forthcoming Soviet Antarctic activities and the assignment of Somov indicate an emphasis that transcends the original CIG plans. These plans do not provide for any such regional programs as were organized

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a program of exploration, mapping, and other scientific activities that would expand the record of Soviet achievements and thus further strengthen the image of a dynamic and "peaceful" USSR, especially in the southern hemisphere.

The USSR continues to demonstrate an interest in having other members of the bloc participate in Antarctic activities. It is giving logistical support to Poland in the re-establishment of its station at Dobrowolski, abandoned in January 1959, despite earlier indications that Polish scientists were unwilling to return.

The USSR has also publicized an "opportunity" for scientists

of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and "other" countries to participate in Antarctic activities. The Czechoslovak Government adhered to the Antarctic Treaty earlier this year, and the press has recently referred to a "Czechoslovak expedition."

East Germany has announced an increase from three to four in the number of its personnel joining the Soviet expedition for the coming season. Whether one of the "other" countries might be Communist China is not known, but it has shown some such interest in the past.

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Exchanges of scientists are again to be made with the US.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****UGANDA**

The British protectorate of Uganda becomes independent on 9 October in an atmosphere of racial harmony and economic well-being relatively high by east African standards. The coalition government of Prime Minister Apolo Milton Obote nevertheless faces substantial problems in overcoming deep tribal differences which constitute the largest single barrier to the country's political stability.

Background

With Europeans comprising less than 0.2 percent and Indians only about one percent of the country's 6.5 million people, Uganda is free of neighboring Kenya's deep racial divisions. The country's unity is instead threatened by centuries-old rivalries between major tribal elements. Each of the four kingdoms and ten tribal districts is jealous of its own identity.

The four kingdoms will enjoy considerable autonomy under a federal system. Of these, Buganda is the largest, wealthiest, and most recalcitrant. It has nearly a third of the country's population and about a quarter of the land area--including the capital city, Kampala.

Buganda's privileged position under British rule has been the root cause of most constitutional and political difficulties in recent years. A series of agreements with the British going back to 1894 guaranteed the position of Buganda's traditional ruler, the Kabaka, and the authority of its own parliament. Other parts of Uganda envied and sought to emulate this position.

Britain's strained relations with the Kabaka throughout the past decade retarded constitutional progress and political development. In 1953, London exiled him, but two years

later allowed him to return to permit steps toward self-government. Twice the Kabaka's followers have boycotted national elections in protest against Britain's unwillingness to grant Buganda sufficient autonomy. However, they returned to full participation in the final steps toward independence this year.

Political Parties

Uganda's first effective political party recruited a big following by backing the Kabaka, but lost its effectiveness by becoming essentially a Buganda party emphasizing traditionalism. No political party on a protectorate-wide scale was formed until early 1961.

At that time two national parties emerged which remain major elements on the political scene: Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC), organized on radical African nationalist lines, and the Democratic Party, (DP), which draws most of its support from Uganda's substantial Catholic population. An amalgamation of the Kabaka's traditionalist followers called Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka alone--KY) enjoys a virtual political monopoly in Buganda. There is no organized Communist movement.

As a result of last April's elections, the UPC holds 43 of the 91 assembly seats, and the DP and KY 24 each. The UPC and KY, with widely divergent approaches to most major issues, form the governing coalition. They are allied mainly out of a common antagonism toward the DP--the UPC on the basis of its political battles with DP outside Buganda, the KY because the DP dared to contest and occupy Bugandan seats at a time when the Kabaka's supporters were boycotting elections. The coalition could collapse at any time.

Obote is an astute professional politician who has

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moved from anonymity to the prime ministership of Uganda in less than five years. Born in 1925 of a minority tribe in northern Uganda, he received local schooling and graduated from the University College at Makerere outside Kampala. During six years in Kenya he became a founder member of the Kenya African Union, under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. He entered Ugandan politics in 1957 and by 1960 had become president of the UPC. A skilled parliamentary debater, he will probably be restrained from pursuing radical policies out of the need to maintain the alliance with the Kabaka's followers.

Other Rivalries

Another threat to Uganda's stability after 9 October comes from the territorial claims of the small kingdom of Bunyoro against Buganda. In the late nineteenth century the British awarded substantial sections of Bunyoro to Buganda as a reward for help in subduing Bunyoro. Widespread disturbances occurred in the area as recently as last February.

At the constitutional conference last June, Colonial Secretary Maudling imposed an arrangement by which the central government will administer the two most hotly contested "lost counties" for two years. At the end of that period a referendum will be held with the choice given of reverting to Buganda, to Bunyoro, or remaining directly under the central government.

Obote has not yet announced how he intends to implement the compromise formula. Since Ugandan opinion outside Buganda supports Bunyoro, the issue could break up the UPC-KY alliance and bring renewed violence in the area.

Prolonged or spreading civil disorder does not appear likely, however, for there are no signif-


icant armed elements in Uganda outside the small but efficient and well-trained security forces. The security forces will probably remain under the command of British officers until native officers are properly trained.

Economic Prospects

Uganda's economic future seems likely to be marked by gradual progress, although the short-term future is clouded by a flight of capital and the departure of many of the few thousand Europeans.

The country's economy is based on agriculture, and most of the people live on subsistence farming. Soil is fertile, the rainfall ample, the equatorial climate moderated by high altitude, and the population not overcrowded. A large and prosperous group of African landowners has developed in Buganda. Per capita income is only \$62 annually, but this is higher than Uganda's neighbors.

The fall in world market prices for cotton and coffee since the early 1950s has hurt

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Uganda, for nearly 80 percent of its export earnings come from these two commodities. The country's real per capita output has been declining as the gross domestic product growth rate has fallen below the 2.5-percent rate of growth of the population.

The Obote government is committed to an ambitious economic development program directed toward the creation of a welfare state, but so far has announced no detailed plans. The World Bank has recommended that Uganda aim at an annual increase of 3-4 percent in the gross domestic product, and has emphasized that agriculture provides the main opportunities for growth. A recent local estimate states that only one acre in six is being cultivated properly. In the effort to diversify, cattle and tea offer the most promise.

The government recognizes the need to slow the departure of European managers and professionals, and is trying to induce them to remain. About 400 out of 1,600 European civil servants have already left. The government estimates that within five years all but a few scientific, technical, and teaching positions can be "Ugandanized," and the rest within ten years.

Uganda also needs the skills and capital of its Indian residents. Indians have been the target of racial animosity in the past, most recently in a boycott of Asian-owned shops and transport facilities in Buganda in 1959-60. Obote has declared his intention of avoiding a recurrence of this and of handling economic problems on a nonracial basis.

Foreign Relations

Obote and other leaders have been extremely close-mouthed about foreign policy. Obote seems to be trying to restrain the neutralist sympathies exhibited by some of his younger and more radical supporters.

Uganda's leaders are committed to Commonwealth membership, but the question of retaining Queen Elizabeth as head of state is still debated vigorously. There is fairly widespread feeling that Uganda should accept economic assistance from both East and West, seeking the most advantageous terms from both. Principal officials have expressed their determination not to become aligned with power blocs or involved in the cold war.

Until now, Obote has sought to minimize contact with the bloc. More than 70 Ugandans nevertheless are now studying there. After independence, several European Communist countries are expected to seek and to be granted diplomatic representation, although Obote may be slower to recognize Communist China. Introduction of these diplomats and the eventual return of the students will lessen Uganda's relative isolation from cold war pressures, and may stimulate some anti-Western sentiments.

Obote has much more sympathy for Nigeria's moderate course in African politics than with Ghana's. He considers Tanganyika wholly under Ghana's influence, expects Kenya to follow the same course. He therefore believes Uganda should stand on its own as a stabilizing force in East Africa rather than join any regional political grouping with Tanganyika and Kenya.

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